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Abstract. It is sometimes claimed that those who succeed with the aid of enhancement 
technologies deserve the rewards associated with their success less, other things being equal, 
than those who succeed without the aid of such technologies. This claim captures some 
widely held intuitions, has been implicitly endorsed by participants in social-psychological 
research, and helps to undergird some otherwise puzzling philosophical objections to the 
use of enhancement technologies. I consider whether it can be provided with a rational basis. 
I examine three arguments that might be offered in its favor and argue that each either shows 
only that enhancements undermine desert in special circumstances, or succeeds only under 
assumptions that deprive the appeal to desert of much of its dialectic interest. 
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Suppose that two budding scientists, Acheson and Baird, gain entry into a highly selective 
doctoral program by attaining the two highest scores in the entry examination. Acheson managed 
this feat only because she used a cognition-enhancing drug—a drug that allowed her to concentrate 
more intensely than all other candidates. Baird succeeded without such pharmaceutical 
assistance. Her success was chiefly attributable to her exceptionally conscientious and efficient 
preparation.  
 Now suppose that two cyclists, Campbell and Donoghue, tie for first in the Olympic road 
race. As a result, each receives many accolades and attractive sponsorship deals. Campbell’s 
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exceptional performance was due in part to his use of a new doping substance; Donoghue’s was 
achieved without doping.  
 Many would find the pharmaceutically assisted achievements of Acheson and Campbell 
to be problematic in a way that those of Baird and Donoghue are not. Some have been prepared 
to generalize from such cases to other enhancements—that is, other biomedical interventions 
intended to augment human capacities from an already healthy, disease-free level. They have 
argued that enhancements are generally (viz. always or almost always)
1
 morally or prudentially 
undesirable in some respect that more traditional means of augmenting our capacities—such as 
education and training—are not.2  
 In what follows I introduce and scrutinize a view that I believe underpins much of this 
opposition to enhancements. This is the view that 
(The Desert Thesis) Individuals who succeed with the aid of enhancements generally 
(viz., always or almost always) deserve the goods associated with that success less than 
otherwise similar individuals who attain the same success without enhancements. 
The term ‘success’ is to be understood here as referring to achievement. Two individuals attain 
the same success if they achieve the same things. ‘The goods associated with that success’ is to 
be understood as referring both to the achievement itself, if achievements are in themselves good 
for the achiever, and to any other prudential goods that the achievement confers on the achiever. 
The desert thesis has often remained implicit in philosophical discussions of 
enhancement, and an initial aim of this article is to bring it to the surface; in §1, I clarify the thesis, 
and in §2, I explain why it is worthy of philosophical attention. My primary aim, however, is to 
challenge the thesis. I pursue this aim by examining what I take to be the three most promising 
arguments that might be offered in support of the thesis: the argument from immoral means (§3), 
                                                 
1
 I henceforth use ‘generally’ as shorthand for ‘always or almost always’.  
2
 See, for the most influential examples, Michael Sandel, The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic 
Engineering (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 92-5; Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman 
Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (New York: Profile Books, 2002), esp. p. 172. 
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the argument from diminished effort (§4), and the argument from shared responsibility (§5). I 
argue that each argument either shows only that enhancements undermine desert in special 
circumstances, thus falling well short of establishing the desert thesis, or succeeds only under 
assumptions that rob appeals to desert of much of their interest as potential grounds for 
objections to enhancement. I conclude (§6) by drawing out some implications of my argument. 
 
1  Clarifying the Desert Thesis 
 
The desert thesis requires three clarifications. These concern (i) the concept of desert that it 
invokes, (ii) the assumptions about the genesis of achievements on which it is grounded, and (iii) 
its scope.  
 First, the concept of desert. The desert thesis makes a claim about the relative desert of 
two groups of people—those who succeed with the aid of enhancements, and otherwise similar 
individuals who succeed without enhancements. I have said what this desert is desert for—it is 
desert for the goods associated with the success. But what kind of desert is it?  
In one commonly deployed sense of desert, to deserve a good is to be entitled to it. If I 
purchase a non-counterfeit lottery ticket bearing the number 14,376, and this number is 
subsequently drawn in the lottery, then I am entitled to the prize—I deserve it, in the entitlement 
sense of desert. But there is another sense of desert in which I may not deserve it: I may not be 
worthy of it; I may be a thoroughly bad person who has already enjoyed far more good luck than 
befits my flawed nature.  
The desert thesis, as I understand it, makes a claim about desert-as-worthiness, not desert-
as-entitlement. It holds that those who succeed with the aid of enhancements are generally less 
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worthy of the goods associated with that success than similar individuals who attain the same 
success without enhancements. 
The distinction between desert-as-entitlement and desert-as-worthiness is sometimes 
equated with a distinction between institutional and pre-institutional desert.
3
  The thought is that 
entitlements depend on prevailing legal and other institutional arrangements, whereas worthiness 
does not. However, worthiness can also depend on institutional context. Consider the case of a 
sporting competition. We can distinguish between the athlete who is entitled to a prize under the 
rules and conventions governing how the prize should be allocated, and the athlete who is most 
worthy of this prize. But it is not the case that the latter athlete could be identified without regard 
for the rules and conventions of the sporting competition. For instance, one factor that is clearly 
relevant to determining who is worthy of the prize is what the conventionally determined purpose 
of the competition was. If the purpose of the competition was to test innate running ability, then 
we may be inclined to say that possessing a high degree of innate running ability is at least one of 
the factors that could make one worthy of the prize. By contrast, if the point of the competition 
was to test effort, then innate running ability may be irrelevant to worthiness.
4
   
Thus, though my focus in what follows will be on worthiness, not entitlement, it does not 
follow that I will be interested only in a pre-institutional kind of desert; indeed, my argument will 
at several points rely on the dependence of desert on institutional context.   
My second clarification concerns the comparison that the desert thesis draws between 
those who succeed with the aid of enhancements and the otherwise similar individuals who 
                                                 
3
 See, for example, Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving; Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 55-87.  
4
 See, for more on this point, David Cummiskey, ‘Desert and Entitlement: A Rawlsian Consequentialist Account’, 
Analysis 47 (1987): 15–19, at p. 18. Note that all of this is consistent with there being some factors that contribute 
to or detract from desert across all institutional contexts. It is also consistent with worthiness and entitlement coming 
apart. For example, suppose that conventions require that a sporting prize is given to the sporting competitor who 
performs the best on the day, even though the (conventionally determined) purpose of the sport is to identify the 
person with the greatest sporting ability, and that person may not perform best on the day. In this context, it is 
plausible that a more able competitor is ceteris paribus more worthy than a less able competitor who outperforms 
him on the day.  
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succeed without enhancements. The thesis holds that the ‘enhanced achievers’ generally deserve 
the goods associated with their achievements less than the comparator ‘unenhanced achievers’. 
As I will sometimes say, omitting reference to the relevant goods and dropping the ‘generally’ 
qualifier, the thesis holds that enhancement ‘undermines desert’ and that unenhanced achievers 
are ‘more deserving’ than enhanced achievers. However, the thesis tells us nothing about how, 
despite the similarities between them, the unenhanced achievers manage to realize the same 
achievements as the enhanced achievers. Do they augment their abilities through means other 
than enhancement? Do they simply try harder? Or did they start from a higher level of ability 
than the unenhanced achievers? We will need to assume some difference between the enhanced 
and unenhanced achievers that compensates for the deployment of enhancements by the latter, 
and the nature of this difference could make an important difference to the plausibility of the 
thesis, since it could affect the degree to which unenhanced achievers deserve the goods in 
question. It is often thought, for example, that those who succeed largely on the basis of innate 
ability deserve the rewards they thereby receive less than those who realize the same success 
despite possessing less innate ability. In order to present the desert thesis in its most plausible 
light, I will assume that the unenhanced achievers started from the same level of ability as the 
enhanced achievers and managed to realize the same achievements through either exerting 
greater effort, or augmenting their abilities through the more traditional means of education or 
training. 
 Finally, my third clarification concerns the scope of the desert thesis. I limit the scope of 
the thesis to achievements whose realization without the aid of enhancement contributes 
positively to the achiever’s desert. That is to say, I limit the thesis to achievements whose 
realization makes the achiever more deserving of the associated goods than she would have been 
had she not realized the achievement at all.  Not all achievements are like this. Successfully 
coordinating a terrorist attack does not make one more deserving of any goods associated with 
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doing so; it makes one less deserving of these goods (and, perhaps, more deserving of certain 
ills). But in many cases, realizing an achievement does make one more deserving of the goods 
associated with that achievement. This is most clearly so when the achievement is a morally 
valuable achievement, but it is plausibly also true of some morally neutral achievements. For 
example, many would hold that one can come to deserve accolades and fame by winning a gold 
medal at the Olympics, though this achievement is arguably morally neutral, or at least, not very 
morally significant.  
 Limiting the scope of the thesis to achievements whose realization contributes positively 
to the achiever’s desert has the advantage of leaving open two quite different ways in which the 
desert thesis could turn out to be correct. It could be that employing enhancements generally 
diminishes the positive influence of realizing an achievement on one’s desert, or it could be that 
employing enhancements generally makes an independent negative contribution to desert.  
 
2  Motivating the Desert Thesis 
 
Having clarified the desert thesis, I am now in a position to explain why I take it as my focus. 
The thesis has at least three claims to philosophical attention.  
First, it yields intuitively plausible verdicts about desert in many cases. Consider what is 
perhaps the paradigmatic example of enhancement: doping in sport. When one athlete succeeds 
with the assistance of a doping substance, we would generally intuit that this athlete deserves the 
rewards associated with his success less than other similarly successful athletes who do not dope. 
Similar thoughts apply to the use of cognition enhancement drugs by students during 
examinations. Consider the case of Acheson and Baird, with which I began. Most would judge 
that Acheson, who used a cognition-enhancing drug, deserves her place on the prestigious PhD 
program less than Baird, who did not. This is precisely what the desert thesis would suggest.  
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Second, the desert thesis, or a restricted version of it, appears to be held, at least implicitly, 
by some members of the public. Faber and collaborators presented healthy participants with a 
scenario in which a protagonist succeeds in completing a cognitively demanding task either with 
or without the assistance of a cognition-enhancing drug. Participants attributed the success less to 
the protagonist, and deemed the success to be less deserved, when the protagonist had used a 
cognitive enhancer than when she had not.
5
 The research subjects appeared to be invoking 
something like the desert thesis, at least in relation to enhancements of cognition. 
 Third, though the desert thesis has, to my knowledge, never been straightforwardly 
asserted in the philosophical literature on enhancement,
6
 it is charitable to attribute it to some of 
those who advance moral or prudential objections to enhancement. 
For instance, certain fairness-based objections to enhancement are difficult to sustain 
without it. Many have objected to enhancements on the ground that they produce unfairness.
7
 In 
some cases, the concern is about unfair inequalities that might result from unequal access to 
enhancement technologies, or about straightforward cheating—the breaking of rules or 
                                                 
5
 Nadira S. Faber et al., ‘Cognitive Enhancement and Motivation Enhancement: An Empirical Comparison of 
Intuitive Judgments’, AJOB Neuroscience 6, 1 (2015): 18–20; also cf. Nadira S. Faber et al. ‘Why is Cognitive 
Enhancement Deemed Unacceptable? The Role of Fairness, Deservingness, and Hollow Achievements’, Frontiers 
in Psychology 7, 232 (2016). 
6
 Some have come close to asserting it. For example, the President’s Council of Bioethics suggested that performance 
enabled through enhancement might be ‘less worthy of admiration’ than other kinds of performance. See its Beyond 
Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness (Washington, DC: President’s Council on Bioethics, 2003), 
p. 140. Variants of the thesis are also briefly critically discussed by Maxwell J. Mehlman in his ‘Cognition-Enhancing 
Drugs’, The Milbank Quarterly 82, 3 (2004): 483–506, at pp. 492-3; and Maartje Schermer in her ‘Enhancements, 
Easy Shortcuts, and the Richness of Human Activities’, Bioethics 22, 7 (2008): 355–63.  
7
 See, for example, President’s Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy, pp. 131-4, 280-1; Fukuyama, Our 
Posthuman Future, pp. 9-10, 97; Steven Rose, The Future of the Brain: The Promise and Perils of Tomorrow’s 
Neuroscience (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 303; Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Ethical Brain: 
The Science of Our Moral Dilemmas, Reprint edition (New York: Harper Perennial, 2006). For discussion, see 
Julian Savulescu, ‘Justice, Fairness, and Enhancement’, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1093, 1 
(2006): 21–38; Thomas Douglas, ‘Enhancement in Sport, and Enhancement Outside Sport’, Studies in Ethics, Law, 
and Technology 1, 1 (2007); and Maartje Schermer, ‘On the Argument That Enhancement Is “Cheating”’, Journal 
of Medical Ethics 34, 2 (2008): 85–8. 
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conventions that others respect. However, others worry that enhancements will generally (viz., 
always or almost always) produce unfairness regardless whether the non-enhancers lacked access 
to enhancements or simply chose not to use them, and regardless whether the enhancement 
infringes any law or convention.
8
  
 The desert thesis can, when conjoined with some prominent accounts of fairness, explain 
why enhancement will generally produce unfairness even in such cases. The relevant accounts of 
fairness hold that fairness, or one species of it, requires that goods are distributed across 
individuals in proportion to the degree to which those individuals deserve those goods.
9
 Thus, it 
is unfair if I have twice as much of some good as you though we are equally deserving of it: 
fairness then requires that, if possible, we enjoy the same amount of this good. It is also unfair if 
I have the same amount of that good as you though you deserve it more: fairness then requires 
that, if possible, you enjoy more of that good.
10
  
 Suppose that you and I succeed in the same way, and enjoy the same rewards as a result. 
But suppose that I realized that success with the aid of an enhancement, whereas you did not. In 
all other respects, we are similar. For example, we were, in advance of realizing the achievement, 
equally well off and equally deserving of the rewards we both go on to receive. If the desert thesis 
holds, then, having both realized the achievement, you are more deserving than me, and it is 
unfair that we in fact enjoy the same rewards; fairness requires that, if possible, you enjoy greater 
rewards than me. By contrast, had I realized the achievement without the enhancement, or 
                                                 
8
 See, for discussion, Schermer, ‘On the Argument That Enhancement Is “Cheating”.’ 
9
 See, for example, Shelley Kagan, The Geometry of Desert (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), esp. at p. 
351; and Fred Feldman, ‘Adjusting Utility for Justice: A Consequentialist Reply to the Objection from Justice’, 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55 (1995): 567–585. Note, however that neither of these authors 
describes their positions precisely as I have here. Kagan prefers to use the term ‘comparative desert’ in place of what 
I call ‘fairness’, though he acknowledges that the term ‘desert sensitive fairness’ could also be used (p. 351); 
Feldman’s view invokes not fairness, but the closely related concept of justice. John Broome has offered a similar 
but broader notion of fairness according to which fairness requires distribution according to the moral claims of 
individuals, where desert is only one among several considerations that could give one a moral claim. See John 
Broome, ‘Fairness’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 91, 1 (1990): 87–102. 
10
 I assume here that the good is divisible. I remain silent on precisely what distribution of rewards is proportionate 
to desert in cases where individuals differ in their degrees of desert. For instance, I remain silent on whether fairness 
requires that A enjoys precisely twice as much of a good as B if A is twice as deserving of it.  
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simply not realized the achievement, there is no reason to suppose that any unfairness would 
have been present between us. My use of the enhancement has had a fairness-disrupting effect.  
 This is not to say that my use of the enhancement has caused an increase in unfairness 
all told, for my use of the enhancement may also mitigate some existing unfairness. Suppose, for 
example, that the rewards that you and I acquire through our achievements consist in some 
quantity of good G. And suppose that, besides you and me, everyone enjoys some very large 
quantity of G—much more than we enjoy before, or indeed even after, our achievements. 
Suppose, moreover, that these others are in fact no more deserving of their large endowments 
of G than us. We thus possess smaller endowments of G than fairness requires. In this setting, 
even though my use of an enhancement may introduce an unfairness between you and me, it will 
also reduce the unfairness between me and everyone else by reducing the degree to which I am 
under-endowed with G, relative to them.
11
 All things considered, the situation may have improved 
with regard to fairness. Still, my use of the enhancement has had some fairness-disrupting effect; 
it introduces unfairness between you and me.  
 The desert thesis also helps to make sense of another oft-heard objection to 
enhancement. Opponents of enhancement sometimes invoke the claim that achievements 
accomplished with the aid of enhancements lack (some of) the value normally attached to 
achievements of the same kind. For instance, Eric Juengst wonders whether achievements 
realized via enhancement might be ‘hollow accomplishments’, while the President’s Council of 
Bioethics claimed that enhancements would undermine the ‘dignity’ of human performance and 
perhaps render that performance ‘false’.12  
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 It reduces this under-endowment by increasing my endowment of G, and perhaps also by reducing my desert for 
G. 
12
 Eric Juengst, ‘What Does Enhancement Mean?’ in Erik Parens (ed.), Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social 
Implications (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000): 29-47, at p. 39; President’s Council on 
Bioethics, Beyond Therapy, esp. at pp. 131, 140.  
 
  10 
 In some cases, enhancements may devalue our achievements because they frustrate the 
very purpose of the activity being pursued; using an enhancement might, to take an oft-cited 
example, be like completing a marathon with the aid of roller skates.
13
 Some activities—like 
marathon running—fulfill their purpose only where pursued in a certain kind of way, and, in some 
cases, enhancement is inimical to the required manner of execution. 
 However, not all activities are such that their purpose is undermined when they are 
pursued with the aid of enhancements.
14
 Consider landing an airliner or performing a surgical 
operation. The purpose of these activities is to realize a certain outcome, and the realization of 
that outcome need not be threatened, and may even be aided, by the use of enhancements. 
Nevertheless, some present the concern about devaluing achievements as a general worry about 
enhancement.
15
 
 The desert thesis is able to explain why enhancement might deprive an achievement of 
some of its value even if the activity being pursued by the enhanced individual continues to serve 
its valuable purpose. It is often thought that normally-valuable evaluenda can lack their normal 
value when they are not deserved.
16
 Pleasure is normally valuable, but some would maintain that 
it lacks some or all of its normal value when it is not deserved.  It is plausible that similar thoughts 
apply to the goods associated with achievements. It may be that the value of these goods 
diminishes as the degree to which they are deserved decreases. Thus, if enhancements 
                                                 
13
 The example originates from Peter J. Whitehouse et al., ‘Enhancing Cognition in the Intellectually Intact’, Hastings 
Center Report 27, 3 (1997): 14–22, at p. 18. 
14
 See, for example, Mehlman, ‘Cognition-Enhancing Drugs’, esp. at p. 493; Douglas, ‘Enhancement in Sport, and 
Enhancement Outside Sport’; Rebecca Roache, ‘Enhancement and Cheating’, Expositions 2, 2 (2008): 153–6; 
Schermer, ‘Enhancements, Easy Shortcuts, and the Richness of Human Activities’ and ‘On the Argument that 
Enhancement is “Cheating”.’ For the most comprehensive discussion of when enhancement undermines the 
purpose of an activity and when it does not, see Filippo Santoni de Sio, Philip Robichaud and Nicole A. Vincent, 
‘Who Should Enhance? Conceptual and Normative Dimensions of Cognitive Enhancement’, Humana.Mente 
Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (2014): 179–97. 
15
 See, for example, President’s Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy, pp. 140-50. 
16
 See, for example, Franz Brentano, Loving and Hating, The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, ed. 
Oskar Kraus, English edition ed. Roderick Chisholm, trans. Roderick Chisholm and Elizabeth Schneewind 
(London: Routledge, 1969), esp. p. 149; and Fred Feldman, ‘Justice, Desert, and the Repugnant Conclusion’, Utilitas 
7, 2 (1995): 189–206. Note that Brentano and Feldman do not deny that undeserved goods remain good for the 
possessor of those goods. The claim is that they do not have their usual value for the world.  
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undermine desert in the way the desert thesis claims, we can expect the achievements that they 
enable to lack some of their normal value, as proponents of the present objection maintain. 
 I believe that it is charitable to impute the desert thesis to many of those who have claimed 
that enhancement generally produces unfairness or devalues our achievements. However, even 
if this is not so, the fact that the desert thesis provides one plausible way of supporting those 
widely advanced claims gives us some reason to at least entertain it as an ethical hypothesis. Let 
us now turn to testing that hypothesis, which I propose to do by examining three candidate 
justifications for it. The first of these is what I call the argument from immoral means.  
 
3  The Argument from Immoral Means 
 
Many believe that enhancement is always morally undesirable in a way that education, training 
and the mere exertion of effort are not. I have suggested that some of this opposition is grounded 
on the desert thesis. But some is clearly not. Some believe that enhancements are undesirable 
for independent reasons, for example, because they alienate the enhanced individuals from their 
true selves,
17
 restrict their freedom or autonomy,
18
 express an ugly desire for mastery,
19
 undermine 
social solidarity,
20
 or poison healthy family and romantic relationships.
21
 Let us suppose, for the 
sake of argument, that at least one of these criticisms is sound—that enhancements are always 
morally undesirable in some desert-independent way that education, training and the mere 
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 Walter Glannon, Genes and Future People: Philosophical Issues in Human Genetics (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 2001), pp. 81-2; President's Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy, pp. 252-60, 293-5; Carl Elliott, Better 
Than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004); Erik 
Parens, ‘Authenticity and Ambivalence: Toward Understanding the Enhancement Debate’, Hastings Center Report 
35, 3 (2005): 34–41. 
18
 Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Maldon, MA: Polity Press, 2003), esp. pp. 64-90. 
19
 Sandel, The Case Against Perfection, pp. 46, 85. See also President's Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy, pp. 
287-90. 
20
 President's Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy, p. 56; Sandel, The Case Against Perfection, pp. 89-91. 
21
 President's Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy, pp. 50-1, 54-5; Parens, ‘Authenticity and Ambivalence’; 
Sandel, The Case Against Perfection, pp. 45-62. 
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exertion of effort are not. In this case, we will have a ready justification for the desert thesis, for 
it is plausible that the adoption of morally undesirable means tends to diminish one’s desert.22 
Thus, suppose that Ewart wins Olympic gold in figure skating, but he wins only because 
he previously assaulted and seriously injured one of his competitors. Or suppose that Ferguson 
wins a Nobel Prize in Medicine, but she wins only because she ruthlessly exploited her junior 
staff. Intuitively, these individuals deserve the goods associated with their success less than the 
typical Olympic gold medalist or Nobel Prizewinner, and one explanation for this appeals to the 
fact that each realizes the achievements through morally undesirable means. If the employment 
of enhancements is always in one way morally undesirable, then similar reasoning could be 
applied to achievements realized with the assistance of enhancements.  
 The difficulty with this approach to defending the desert thesis is that it relies on the 
existence of an independent (of desert) basis for supposing that enhancements are morally 
undesirable. To establish that any particular enhancement undermines desert, we must first 
establish that there is an independent objection to it, and to establish that enhancement generally 
undermines desert, as the desert thesis maintains, we must establish that there is an independent 
general objection to enhancement. This deprives appeal to deserts of much of their dialectic 
interest in the ethical debate on enhancement. Such appeals derive much of their interest from 
their potential to fill a justificatory gap—to establish that enhancements are morally or 
prudentially undesirable in some cases where we would otherwise be unable to establish this. On 
the present argument, however, appeals to desert can at most establish a supplementary objection 
to enhancement.  
 Let us turn, then, to consider whether it is possible to defend the desert thesis in a way 
that does not diminish its dialectic significance in this way. 
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 I assume here that the moral desirability of the means via which individuals pursue their goals is always known to 
them in advance.  
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4  The Argument from Diminished Effort 
 
A second argument for the desert thesis is suggested by the claim, sometimes advanced as an 
objection to enhancement, that enhancements make our achievements ‘too easy’. Ronald Cole-
Turner worries that  
The new means [of augmenting normal human capacities], such as psychopharmacology and genetic 
alteration, are perhaps more efficient or easier than the traditional means. But for that reason, they 
should be opposed . . . There is, after all, a glory and a dignity in human accomplishment attained 
the “old-fashioned way,” through sweat and struggle, sometimes against great odds.23 
Leon Kass develops the point further: 
in those areas of human life in which excellence has until now been achieved only by discipline and 
effort, the attainment of those achievements by means of drugs, genetic engineering, or implanted 
devices looks to be “cheating” or “cheap.” We believe—or until only yesterday believed—that people 
should work hard for their achievements. “Nothing good comes easily.” Even if one prefers the grace 
of the natural athlete, whose performance deceptively appears to be effortless, we admire those who 
overcome obstacles and struggle to try to achieve the excellence of the former...
24
  
One way of making sense of these worries would see them as adverting to the putative relationship 
between effort and desert. It is often thought that the exertion of effort can confer desert,
25
 and it 
is not difficult to generate intuitions that support this view. Suppose that Gibbs and Hamilton 
both complete a marathon in just under four hours. The two trained similarly hard for the event, 
but there is a large gulf in natural ability between the two. Gibbs is a naturally gifted runner, so 
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 Ronald Cole-Turner, ‘Do Means Matter’, in Erik Parens (ed.), Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social 
Implications (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000): 151–61, at p. 155. 
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 Kass, ‘Ageless Bodies, Happy Souls’, p. 21. See also Daniel L. Tobey, ‘What’s Really Wrong with Genetic 
Enhancement: A Second Look at Our Posthuman Future’, Yale Journal of Law and Technology 6 (2003): 54–160, 
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 See, for example, Wojciech Sadurski, Giving Desert Its Due: Social Justice and Legal Theory (Springer Science 
& Business Media, 1985); Heather Milne, ‘Desert, Effort and Equality’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 3, 2 (1986): 
235–43; Kelly Sorensen, ‘Effort and Moral Worth’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13, 1 (2010): 89–109.  
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for him, completing the marathon under four hours took little effort. Indeed, he has run much 
more quickly in the past. Hamilton, by contrast, is genetically unsuited to long distance running. 
For him, completing the marathon at all took Herculean effort.  
 It would be tempting to say, regarding this case, that Hamilton is in one way more 
deserving of the goods associated with his achievement than Gibbs. This is not to say that he is 
all-things-considered more deserving—some would argue that, perhaps since sports are designed 
in part to test or display natural ability, one of the things that can make one deserving of sporting 
success, and associated rewards, is precisely the kind of natural ability that Gibbs possesses. But 
there seems to be something pulling in the other direction also. There seems to be some respect 
in which Hamilton is more deserving than Gibbs. A natural way to account for this intuitive 
judgment would be to appeal to the fact that Hamilton must have exerted more effort than Gibbs 
to achieve his success.  
 Consider now a second case, this time involving the use of a (let us suppose) permitted 
enhancement. Irvine and Jardine have roughly equal innate running ability and have trained 
equally hard. They both complete a marathon in just under three hours—much faster than either 
has run previously. Irvine’s unusually quick time is due to her pushing herself exceptionally hard 
during the race; Jardine’s is attributable to her having taken the blood-thickening dietary 
supplement in the weeks leading up to the race. Again, we might be tempted to say that Irvine 
deserves any success associated with her achievement more than does Jardine. And again, we 
might posit that this is due to Irvine’s greater exertion of effort.  
 We can generalize from this case. It is not a coincidence that Jardine employed an 
enhancement and exerted less effort than Irvine. It might seem that, in general, individuals who 
have employed enhancements will have exerted less effort to realize an achievement than other 
individuals who realize the same achievement without the assistance of enhancements but instead 
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through training, education or merely trying harder. All of these alternative routes to achievement 
typically involve the greater exertion of effort than does the pursuit of enhancement.
26
 Perhaps, 
then, enhanced achievers are generally less deserving than comparable unenhanced achievers 
because they generally exerted less effort in the realization of those achievements.  
This argument—the argument from diminished effort—may seem susceptible to a quick 
response: in some cases, enhancements lead the enhanced individual to exert more effort than 
she would otherwise have exerted. Indeed, some enhancements work precisely by augmenting a 
person’s ability or willingness to exert effort; consider the use of anabolic steroids to speed muscle 
recovery after training, thus allowing an athlete to train again more quickly. Even if the pursuit of 
an enhancement requires less effort than alternative means of augmenting one’s abilities, one 
effect of the enhancement may be to increase one’s exertion of effort, and this desert-augmenting 
influence could predominate. 
I believe that this quick response may be sufficient to undermine the argument from 
diminished effort, but I will not pursue it here, for two reasons.  
First, it applies only to a rather narrow range of enhancements. This response may show 
that some enhancements augment effort and thus desert, and thus undermine the desert thesis, 
as I have characterized it. However, the victory may end up being rather hollow, for the great 
majority of enhancements may nevertheless undermine effort, and thus desert. By contrast, the 
response that I will offer below applies more generally.  
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 It is not clear that augmenting one’s abilities via enhancement always requires no effort, or even less effort than 
augmenting them via more traditional means (see, e.g., Mehlman, ‘Cognition-Enhancing Drugs’, at p. 492). Imagine 
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alternative, more traditional means. Nevertheless, I will assume for the sake of argument that enhancements always 
require less effort than alternative means of augmenting one’s abilities. 
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Second, the quick response is susceptible to a possible objection. The objection holds 
that what matters for desert is not the absolute level of effort that one exerts, but the level of effort 
one exerts relative to one’s potential for exerting effort. What matters, in other words, is the 
degree to which one realizes this potential. If ‘potential for exerting effort’ is understood so as to 
incorporate all biological influences on the level of effort that one in fact exerts, then 
enhancements, whose effects are biological, must operate by augmenting potential for exerting 
effort, rather than the degree to which this potential is realized. On the present objection, this 
will confer no increase in desert.  
I do not wish to endorse this objection—indeed, I think its prospects are not rosy, for 
reasons I have pursued elsewhere.
27
 Still, if we could offer a response to the argument from 
diminished effort that evaded this sort of objection, that would be preferable, and as it happens, 
I believe that we can do just that.   
Rather than employing the quick response, which holds that some enhancements 
augment effort, I will pursue an alternative line of response to the argument from diminished 
effort. My response concedes that enhancements undermine effort, but maintains that they 
nevertheless need not undermine desert.  
The response begins from the observation that, in some circumstances, adopting a lower 
effort route to some achievement has no negative effect on one’s desert for the goods associated 
with that achievement.
28
 One such circumstance is where an agent has the option of realizing the 
achievement via either a lower or higher effort route, and there is no more reason to pursue the 
higher effort route than the lower effort route. In such a case, adopting the higher effort route 
involves exerting gratuitous effort—effort that there is no more reason to exert than not—and it 
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 Thomas Douglas, ‘Enhancing Moral Conformity and Enhancing Moral Worth’, Neuroethics 7, 1 (2014): 75–91. 
28
 Schermer, ‘Enhancements, Easy Shortcuts, and the Richness of Human Activities’, at pp. 359-60. 
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would be at the very least puzzling if gratuitously doing things the hard way could make one more 
deserving of goods.
29
 
 Suppose, then, that two similar agents face a choice regarding how to realize some 
achievement. They can either employ an enhancement or a more effortful traditional route 
involving, say, extra training. Both options are available to both agents, and the agents are aware 
of the amount of effort that each route to the achievement entails. The first agent chooses to 
employ the enhancement; the second adopts the more traditional route.  
 If there is no more reason to abstain from the enhancement than to pursue it, then the 
second agent, who eschews the enhancement, is simply exerting gratuitous effort, and exerting 
gratuitous effort cannot make one more deserving.
30
 
 Of course, in many circumstances in which enhancements are used, there may be reasons 
to adopt a higher-effort route. For example, if we think that part of the point of sports is to elicit 
extreme levels of effort, then the athlete may well have reasons to eschew effort-reducing 
enhancements. However, if this is the case, we already have an independent (of desert) objection 
to pursuit of the enhancement. Thus, we are back with the problem faced by the argument from 
immoral means. The appeal to diminished effort will succeed in establishing that a particular 
enhancement undermines desert only if there is an independent objection to that enhancement, 
and it will succeed in establishing the desert thesis only if there is an independent general 
objection to enhancement. Without an independent objection to an enhancement, there will be 
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 Similar points are made in Milne ‘Desert, Effort and Equality’, p. 240; and Thomas Douglas, ‘The Relationship 
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will fail whenever the effort involved in avoiding an enhancement is (reasonably) believed to be gratuitous. 
30
 It might still be argued that the individual who uses the enhancement is less deserving than one who only has the 
higher-effort route available—someone who has no access to enhancement.  
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no reason to suppose that we should prefer traditional routes to the realization of an 
achievement—no reason to suppose that the additional effort exerted in the pursuit of the 
traditional route would be nongratuitous.  
Two possible responses to this suggestion need to be considered. The first maintains that 
the effort exerted in avoiding an enhancement is rarely gratuitous, because effort almost always 
has the instrumental value of helping to cultivate a disposition or ability to exert (nongratuitous) 
effort in the future. Exerting effort, it might be said, is generally character-building. Yet even if 
exerting effort did generally conduce to desirable forms of psychological development, a claim 
that has been questioned,
31
 there is no good basis for assuming that reasons to pursue such 
psychological development will always, or even typically, be decisive. After all, exerting effort also 
has predictable costs. Realizing a given achievement via a more rather than a less effortful route 
will, for example, tend to diminish one’s ability and willingness to realize other valuable goals.  
The second response maintains that even gratuitous effort makes one more deserving. 
Certain intuitive reactions might seem to support this view. Suppose that Kerr and Lester 
independently make the same scientific discovery. Both relied on the same sophisticated piece 
of statistical software in making this discovery, however, as an additional challenge, Kerr had one 
of her colleagues program a number of bugs into the software. Thus, Kerr had to overcome a 
number of software glitches to make the discovery, whereas Lester did not. Kerr had to exert 
more effort. Suppose, moreover, that any reason Kerr had to exert this effort in order to develop 
desirable character traits was outweighed by countervailing reasons: perhaps, for example, the 
effort of overcoming the software bugs also drained her energy in a way that predictably impaired 
her ability to produce other smaller scientific insights in the course of making her chief discovery.  
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 Schermer, ‘Enhancements, Easy Shortcuts, and the Richness of Human Activities’, at pp. 357-8; Lisa Forsberg, 
‘No Pain, No Gain? Objections to the Use of Cognitive Enhancement on the Basis of Its Potential Effects on the 
Value of Achievement’ in E. Hildt and A. G. Franke (eds.) Cognitive Enhancement: An Interdisciplinary Perspective 
(Springer Netherlands, 2013): 159–71, at pp. 168-9. 
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Though I do not share the intuition myself, I concede that some might wish to claim that 
Kerr deserves more praise for her achievement than Lester, even though the extra effort she 
exerted appears to be gratuitous.  
 It is not clear, however, that this intuition supports the view that gratuitous effort can 
confer desert, for we can accommodate the intuition without endorsing that view. We may take 
Kerr to be more deserving of praise than Lester because we take her exertion of gratuitous effort 
as evidence that, had a greater level of effort been necessary to realize the achievement—say, 
because only buggy software was available—she would have exerted it. This would suggest that it 
is the counterfactual exertion of nongratuitous effort by Kerr that confers her greater desert, not 
her actual exertion of gratuitous effort.
32
  
 Thus, it is possible to explain the intuition that Kerr is more deserving than Lester without 
attributing a desert-conferring effect to gratuitous effort, and since it would be at the very least 
puzzling if gratuitous effort could confer desert, we should tentatively accept this alternative 
explanation.  
 I take it, then, that exerting gratuitous effort confers no desert. It follows that, for any 
given enhancement, there is either an independent (of desert) objection to the pursuit of the 
enhancement, thus deflating the dialectic significance of the claim that the enhancement 
undermines desert, or the appeal to diminished effort fails to establish that the enhancement 
undermines desert, since the there is no reason to suppose that the effort exerted through 
eschewing the enhancement would have been non-gratuitous.  
 
5  The Argument from Shared Responsibility    
 
                                                 
32
 I made this point also in my ‘The Relationship between Effort and Moral Worth’. 
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A third argument for the desert thesis is suggested by another claim sometimes advanced as an 
objection to enhancement. Daniel Tobey writes that 
With enhancement we achieve an end not through struggle but with the ease of one selecting an item 
from a menu—it is the difference between cooking a meal and ordering in. The purchased meal might 
taste better objectively, but it is not ours, and in not working for it, we lose the sense of ownership and 
accomplishment. [Tobey’s italics]33  
The primary claim here is ostensibly that enhancement might diminish our sense of ownership 
for our achievements, but Tobey also appears to suggest that we would in fact own our 
achievements less, for he writes that the purchased meal ‘is not ours’ [my italics]. I take Tobey 
to be suggesting here that enhanced individuals are not responsible (or not fully responsible) for 
the achievements that their enhancements enable.
34
  
Responsibility should, for the purposes of this discussion, be understood as 
attributability.
35
 An agent A is in this sense responsible for x if and only if x can aptly be attributed 
to agent A. Attributability is more than mere causal responsibility, since it necessarily involves 
agency on the part of the responsible individual; indeed, it is normally supposed that x is 
attributable to A because x is a product or expression of A’s agency. On the other hand, 
attributability is less than (though it is probably necessary for) moral responsibility, where the 
latter is taken to entail moral praise- or blame-worthiness. An action could be an expression of 
one’s agency, and thus attributable to one, though the agency it expresses is morally 
unremarkable and one is thus worthy of neither praise nor blame.
36
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 I take it, then, that Tobey is suggesting that use of enhancements generally diminishes the 
degree to which the resulting achievements can be attributed to the agent who undergoes the 
enhancement. Why think that enhancement diminishes responsibility in this way?  
One thought might be that the responsibility of enhanced achievers is diminished because 
some responsibility for the achievements that they realize lies elsewhere—it lies with the designers 
(and perhaps also the prescribers) of the enhancement. A parallel point can be made regarding 
the use of external technologies in certain sports: consider the yachtswoman who wins a regatta 
because her friend loans her an especially fast boat, or the Formula One driver who wins a grand 
prix because his team provides him with the fastest car available. We might be inclined to say 
that these competitors are less responsible for their victories than they would have been had they 
realized them with a standard yacht and car, respectively, because more of the responsibility for 
their achievements is borne by others: the designers and providers of the assistive technologies. 
The proponent of the present claim takes a similar view about achievements enabled by 
enhancements: the responsibility of the enhanced achiever is reduced because that responsibility 
is shared with, for example, the designers and distributors of the enhancement technology. 
If the partial responsibility of others generally diminishes the responsibility of enhanced 
achievers for the achievements they realize, then we will, I think, have a plausible argument for 
the desert thesis. Sometimes, realizing an achievement confers desert in the sense that, through 
achieving something, the achiever comes to deserve (some of) the goods associated with the 
achievement, or to deserve them to a greater degree. As noted earlier, this is not always so: for 
example, realizing evil achievements does not make one (more) worthy of any associated rewards. 
But we are limiting ourselves to cases in which realizing an achievement without the aid of an 
enhancement would make one more deserving of the associated goods. In such cases, we might 
expect that the degree of desert conferred will tend to diminish with one’s responsibility for the 
achievement. A reduction in the degree to which one is responsible for an achievement will tend 
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to reduce the degree to which one deserves the goods attached to that achievement.
37
 This meshes 
well with our intuitions about the yachtswoman and Formula One driver. Intuitively, these 
individuals are not only less responsible for their victories than they would have been had they 
achieved them without superior equipment, they are also less deserving of the rewards that come 
with this victory, even if they remain fully entitled to those rewards, for instance, because the rules 
of the competition allow them to use such superior equipment. 
 If the use of enhancements generally reduces one’s responsibility for one’s achievements, 
then there is a prima facie credible argument for the desert thesis. However, it is far from clear 
that enhancement does reduce responsibility in this way. Intuitions about the yachtswoman and 
Formula One driver might seem to support this view. But two cases cannot prove the rule. These 
cases show, at most, that in some instances reliance on technology diminishes responsibility, but 
what we need is a justification for the view that that reliance on technology, or at least 
enhancements, will generally (that is, always or almost always) have this effect.  
 Let us consider two candidate justifications. The first holds that responsibility is zero-
sum: for any achievement, there is a fixed amount of responsibility to go around. Thus, if the 
designer of an enhancement is partly responsible for a post-enhancement achievement, the user 
of the enhancement is necessarily not fully responsible for it. 
 This justification has unacceptable implications.  Suppose that A, B and C together rob 
a corner store, while elsewhere and entirely independently D robs a different corner store. Each 
of A, B, C and D is, then, partially or fully responsible for the robbing of a corner store. But 
intuitively, the degree of responsibility of each of A, B and C for the robbing of a store is more 
than a third of the degree of responsibility of D. Consequently, we would not, for example, be 
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inclined to punish each of A, B and C only a third as severely as D. The total degree of 
responsibility of A, B and C is greater than that of D, indicating that responsibility for the robbing 
of a store is not zero-sum; the total amount of responsibility can increase as the number of 
individuals who share the responsibility increases.  
 The claim that responsibility is zero-sum has implausible implications. Let us turn, then, 
to the second candidate justification for the view that the use of enhancements reduces 
responsibility. This justification holds that, when you use an enhancement to achieve some 
outcome, you ‘outsource’ some of the agential processes required to bring about that outcome; 
you employ someone else to invest her agency in realizing the achievement, and in doing so you 
diminish the role played by your own agency. Thus, the achievement is less an expression of 
your agency than it would otherwise have been. When the Formula One driver accepts the faster 
car from his team, it is not just that he allows the agency of others to influence his level 
achievement, he reduces the call for investing his own agency. Without the faster car, he would 
have had to train harder, or make better tactical decisions, to achieve the same result. Perhaps 
those who realize achievements with the aid of enhancements can also be thought of as 
outsourcing some of the agential tasks required to realize an achievement. 
 This justification—the ‘outsourcing justification’—also runs into difficulties, however.  
An initial response to it would mirror the ‘quick response’ to the argument from 
diminished effort that I considered in the previous section. Even if outsourcing agential tasks 
would in one way tend to diminish the role played by the enhanced person’s own agency in 
realizing an achievement, it might in other ways tend to augment her investment of agency: for 
example, the enhancement may operate by augmenting the agential resources that the 
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enhancement user has available to invest.
38
 This will most obviously be so in relation to 
enhancements that diminish psychological impediments to the exercise of agency. Suppose you 
face a choice between several alternative courses of action, but suppose you have a number of 
false beliefs about the nature and likely consequences of these options. Suppose also that you 
are subject to a number of impulses that might lead you to take an option other than the one you 
reflectively endorse. These false beliefs and impulses are plausibly impediments to your agency. 
But a cognition enhancement might help to correct these false beliefs, and a motivation 
enhancement might attenuate these impulses. A possible upshot of either enhancement would 
be that your decision becomes more reflective of your agency, and less reflective of impediments 
to it. 
As with the quick response to the argument from diminished effort, I believe that this 
response may be sufficient to refute the outsourcing justification, and thus, the argument from 
shared responsibility, but, also as with that response, it will apply to a rather narrow range of 
enhancements, and it may be susceptible to the objection that what matters is not absolute 
investment of agency, but investment relative to one’s potential to do so. For these reasons, I 
pursue an alternative response to the outsourcing justification—one that applies more generally 
and is not susceptible to this possible objection.  
My response begins from the observation that, on the outsourcing justification, it is not 
ultimately the enhanced individual’s increased reliance on others’ agency that diminishes her 
responsibility, it is her decreased reliance on her own agency. On the outsourcing justification, 
then, cases of enhancement are relevantly similar to cases in which a person is less reliant on her 
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own agency not because she has deployed an enhancement, or otherwise outsourced a task to 
someone else, but for some other reason: for example, through good fortune of circumstance. 
The scientist who employs a cognitive enhancement and thus diminishes the need to exert her 
own agency in her work is, from the perspective of the outsourcing justification, equivalent to a 
scientist who, through no good planning of her own, happens to find herself in an inspiring and 
distraction-free environment; an environment that allows her to make scientific progress with less 
need to invest her own agency than a comparable scientist in less favorable conditions. Note, 
however, that we would not normally regard an individual as less responsible for her 
achievements, in the sense that the achievements are less attributable to her, merely because she, 
though good fortune, finds herself in more favorable conditions and thus with less need to invest 
her own agency.  
There are at least two plausible explanations for why reduced investment of agency does 
not necessarily reduce responsibility. On the first explanation, full responsibility is retained as 
long as the investment of agency surpasses some threshold. Thus, there is a range over which a 
reduction in agency invested confers no reduction in responsibility. On the second explanation, 
only a certain kind of agency needs to be invested in order to fully preserve responsibility. For 
example, it may be necessary only that the individual exercises executive control over how her 
abilities, the assistance of others, and any other available resources are marshalled towards the 
realization of an achievement. On this view, an individual can outsource many individual tasks 
required for the realization of an achievement without diminishing her own responsibility, 
provided that she continues to exercise executive control in drawing on the assistance of others. 
Thus, for example, if the Formula 1 driver in our abovementioned example had been actively 
involved in deciding which technological innovations in car design to adopt, his responsibility for 
his grand prix victory would not have been diminished by his being provided with the especially 
fast car.  
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Both of these explanations for why reduced investment of agency need not reduce 
responsibility could be invoked in relation to some enhancements. Even where enhancements 
involve outsourcing tasks to others, thereby reducing the need for the enhanced individual to 
invest his own agency, they may nevertheless leave the enhanced individual above the threshold 
level of agency-investment required for full responsibility on the first explanation. And provided 
that the enhancer continues to exercise his agency in, for example, deciding how to employ 
enhancements, or the abilities that they confer, he may retain the kind of executive control 
required for full responsibility according to the second explanation.  
Reflection on cases in which the call for agential investment is diminished by accidents of 
circumstance suggests that the cases in which enhancements diminish responsibility by 
diminishing agential investment will be rare. In most cases, those who, through good fortune, 
enjoy extremely favourable circumstances nevertheless retain full responsibility, in the sense of 
attributability, for their achievements, suggesting that only a modest level of agential investment 
or executive control is required for full responsibility. This suggests that most enhancements will 
also preserve full responsibility.  
 
6  Implications   
  
I have assessed three arguments for the desert thesis. I argued that the third of these—the 
argument from shared responsibility—fails to justify the thesis: it is not the case that enhancements 
generally diminish responsibility; indeed, I have just suggested that in most cases they do not. By 
contrast, I allowed that the first two arguments—the argument from immoral means and the 
argument from effort—might succeed. However, I argued that they succeed in showing that an 
enhancement undermines desert only in those cases where there is already an independent 
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objection to the enhancement, and in these cases, the appeal to desert loses much of its dialectic 
interest.  
 It is possible, of course, that there is some other argument for the desert thesis that I have 
missed. However, it is not clear what this argument could be, and the literature on the ethics of 
enhancement is of little help here.
39
 In that literature, the desert thesis typically functions as a 
premise (usually implicit), not as a conclusion, and when authors sympathetic to the desert thesis 
have alluded to considerations that might support it, they have alluded to the argument from 
diminished effort and the argument from shared responsibility. 
Let us thus tentatively assume that we have assessed the only credible arguments for the 
desert thesis. This leaves the proponent of the thesis with two options. First, she can rely on the 
argument from shared responsibility and accept that there is no rational basis for the view that 
enhancement generally undermines desert, or indeed for the view that it does so in any more 
than a very narrow range of cases: most enhancements preserve full responsibility. Second, she 
can turn to either the argument from immoral means or the argument from diminished effort. 
However, she is then forced to concede that the desert thesis either fails (because there is no 
general independent objection to enhancement) or has little dialectic significance (because there 
is such an objection). More broadly, she is then forced to concede that desert-based explanations 
for why any particular enhancement is morally problematic will either fail or have little dialectic 
significance.  
Nevertheless, my argument does draw attention to some cases in which use of 
enhancements will undermine desert. One of these cases is where the enhancement dramatically 
diminishes the investment of agency on the part of the enhanced individual. Another is where 
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the enhancement reduces the amount of effort that the enhanced individual exerts but there 
were, in fact, good independent reasons to exert that effort. One such case will be where the 
enhancement is employed in the context of an activity whose value lies, at least in part, in its 
effortfulness (which I suspect is true of many sporting endeavours); in such contexts, there is an 
independent objection to avoiding effort, and thus to pursuing the enhancement: doing so 
undermines the value of the activity in which one is engaged.
 40
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